A critical review of old Naval Reports, showing how some difficulties in the epidemiology vanished when the mosquito means of transmission was discovered.
Yellow fever was a disease whose behaviour at sea was a baffling enigma before its method of transmission by mosquitoes was discovered, and my address describes some observations on yellow fever in Her Majesty's ships, which have been exhumed from their graves in the official reports of the Royal Navy.
(1) The nomenclature of fever.-Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century the nomenclature of tropical fevers was chaotic. According to Augustin [1] there were 105 synonyms for yellow fever, and there were probably as many for malaria. Such meanilngless diagnoses as 'coast," " jungle," "ardent" or "bilious" fever, were constantly used in describing the same disease. After pointing out the false sense of accuracy and confusion that is caused by the indiscriminate use of such fancy names, Alexander Bryson, a famous Naval Medical Director General, who wrote in 1847, only allowed three headings for fever in the Naval returns-intermittent, remittent, and yellow. The first must have been chiefly benign tertian and quartan malaria, the second was largely subtertian malaria, with a variable amount of enteric fever and missed yellow fever cases. In the earlier period practically all the cases recorded as yellow fever must have been properly diagnosed, since haematemesis, jaundice, and death were generally necessary before the diagnosis was allowed; and the records show that spirochaetal jaundice could never have been prevalent in the Navy. On the West African Station all but an insignificant fraction of the fever mortality was caused by yellow fever. Typhoid fever has always been very rare in the West African Squadron, but complicates the fever mortality in one or two of the annual reports from the West Indies. Remittent fever, when malaria, was relative to yellow fever a negligible cause of death. Moreover, deaths from cerebral malaria were, I fancy, often entered as apoplexy or sunstroke.
(2) The contagiousness of yellow fever.-In the earlier part of our period, the opinion of British Naval Medical Officers was on the whole against the disease being contagious. I suppose this was due to the belief that yellow was only a FEB.-UNIT. SERV. 1 malignant variety of remittent fever, that is malaria, and ships' surgeons recognized "malaria " was a " place " disease which did not spread from man to man in ships. Also, as we shall see, far more often than not, a ship produced only a sporadic case or two of yellow fever which showed no tendency to spread to other members of the crew-extensive ship epidemics where the disease had all the appearance of being highly infectious were relatively rare. The theory that yellow fever was noncontagious was also supported by such evidence as the following. In 1829 H.M.S. "Sybille " was badly stricken with yellow fever and the morale of the ship's company was at a low ebb. Surgeon McKinnial, in order to show that the disease was noncontagious, toasted his brother officers in a wineglass of black vomit. Chavin, a French Naval Surgeon, also drank black vomit and rubbed it into his skin. These experiments, really had little significance since both officers had been in the endemic area for some time, and, hence were probably immune. The contagionists supported their theory by the devastating ship epidemics, the apparent infection of many places by ships, and the high mortality among medical men. As regards this fatality, Plazy [2] states, that in 1802 at San-Domingo 208 out of 300 doctors died, and that the absolute mortality (not case fatality) in places when yellow fever was epidemic rarely fell below 60% per annum among French Naval Surgeons, which suggests that the expectation of life of an unseasoned medical man in yellow fever outbreaks was about four months. The British Naval record gives no exact figures of the wastage in Surgeons, but, as we shall see, it was certainly great. The recent cases in London, described by Low and Fairley [3] , where those handling blood from a yellow fever patient contracted the disease under circumstances which exclude any possibility of mosquito transmission, suggest that direct transmission may have been a factor of weight in the great mortality among the ships' doctors of the past. Moreover Carter [4] discusses the mysterious infection of a medical man who contracted fatal yellow fever in 1918, while attending a stevedore who had developed the disease after coming inland from an infected ship to a locality where Aedes was nonexistent. And, even had the specific vector been present, there was not time enough for the extrinsic incubation of the virus in a local insect before this doctor developed yellow fever. Carter [4] , decided that the stevedore must have brought home with him an infected mosquito from his ship; but, as in the London cases this doctor might have been infected through the skin by blood drawn in the early stage of the disease for laboratory investigation. Assuming this was true, it might appear that medical attendants ran a great risk of infection from contact with the blood from the gums and stomach of yellow fever patients, but although early bleeding may occur, yet the typical haemorrhages of the disease are rare before the third day, by which time the blood is inactive. If direct transmission was more than an exceptional unnatural event, a densely crowded ship was the place in which to find it, but it was just this absence of any evidence of direct transmission which made many Naval medical men so certain that the disease was non-contagious. (See account of the "Isis" below.) By the middle of the century most ships' doctors held the theory which is well put by a French Naval Surgeon:-" Yellow fever is not contagious from patient to patient, but a ship may become impregnated with contagion and communicate it to the whole ship's company."
This hypothesis described the facts. A seaman who got yellow fever ashore was no danger to his shipmates unless the ship was infested with Aedes wqypti, or in the words of the Frenchman, " impregnated with contagion."
(3) The cutiology.-The exciting cause common to all tropical fevers was considered to be bad air from the swamps ashore, decaying refuse in the ship, or even rotten ships' timbers. The type of fever was thought to depend on the constitution of the individual or herd at different times, and on secondary causes which rendered 9 United Services Section 445 the subject more susceptible to the effects of the telluric emanations. Among the secondary causes of tropical fever, exposure at night was thought to bs especially dangerous. As much effort was made in those days to prevent the men exposing themselves to the night air by sleeping on the upper deck, as we now make to encourage them to do so. Sexual and alcoholic excess were also stressed as causes of fever. This belief arose from the fact that in drinking dens and brothels the sailors came in close contact with the insect vector and the native reservoir of infection. Chill and physical fatigue were considered to be important secondary causes of tropical fever. This belief was based on the high rate of fever among the men employed in boats away from the ship. Boat work in the slave blockade was strenuous. We read of boats crews pulling forty or more miles up creeks to cut out the slaver. Then, after a skirmish with the enemy, they might spend the night wet through from tropical storms in open boats in pestilential creeks or camped in native villages. On returning from such an expedition it was not unusual for the whole party to go down with fever. Bryson, with his usual acumen, refused to believe that fatigue itself was the cause of fever but rather the extra exposure to the night air of the swamps. In support of his contentions he cites many observations among which is the following experiment. Two boat parties were detached from their ship to survev the mouth of a river. The one, as was the custom, when night fell tied up to the bank of the river, so as to be ready in the morning to proceed with the survey where they had left off. The other party were ordered to pull back to the mouth of the river each day before sunset and anchor out at sea. The second party, therefore, had much more work and hardship than the first. The whole of the first party contracted fever within one month and had to be relieved, while the second party completed the survey, and after three months returned to the ship " in more robust and health than when they had left " a well-conceived and controlled experiment showing that boat work in itself was harmless, and even beneficial, to health, and that fever must generally be contracted at night from something in the swamps and rivers, but that the sea air a sufficient distance off shore was free from contagion. As a result of his observations Bryson urges the authorities to make an order that no boats are to remain away from their ship at night unless circumstances make it imperative. Such an order he says "would do more to reduce the sickness of the squadron than perhaps all other means of prevention put together." The best observers of the day including Bryson, however, knew that the proximity of swamps after sundown did not explain the whole ctiology of tropical fevers, and especially that of yellow fever, and as regards this type there still remained the disconcerting fact that in places such as Freetown, on high ground away from the swamps and rivers, and in certain ships in mid-ocean, virulent epidemics of yellow fever could materialize. Moreover it was also noted some of the worst outbreaks of yellow fever occurred in times of drought. An observation which at first became more puzzling with the discovery of mosquito transmission until it was realized that the drier the season the greater the tendency to store water in the house and to provide the only breeding places which Aedes zegypti could use when all casual water in the open had dried up. Bryson and his contemporaries had, however, got as near the correct solution of the problem of" malarial "tropical fever as was possible before the means of transmission was known.
Before the mosquito was incriminated, the supreme mystery of yellow fever to Naval Surgeons was its apparent lack of infectiousness at one time and its potentiality of decimating a whole ship's company at another. From among numerous events, I have picked out the following story as one which illustrates practically all the peculiar points in the epidemiology of yellow fever at sea. I must first explain that it was, and to a less extent is, the fashion to moor old hulks at Naval Bases to act as dep6ts, where men await an opportunity to join their ships, or to take passage home, or to proceed to other stations. In 1865 the "Isis" was the depot ship at Sierra Leone. This year yellow fever is said to have destroyed 27% of the European colony. The first case of yellow fever in the " Isis" was reported on September 28. Then follows a description of case after case of men passing through the ship and contracting the disease. Among these was the Surgeon of the " Rattlesnake " who was attending the sick in the " Isis," her own doctor being dead of the disease. The surgeon of the " Rattlesnake" went back to die in his own ship, and apparently infected her, since yellow fever broke out in epidemic form and continued until the " Rattlesnake" went north on December 24. On December 26 the authorities, realizing that the " Isis " was infected, decided to have her cleaned out, and 112 men from H.M.S." Bristol " were told off for this duty. This party worked on board the " Isis" for two days from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. The first case in the " Bristol " appeared on December 31, altogether 39 cases, 25 of which died, were recorded. Everyone of these cases was among the 112 men who had been on board the "Isis "; there was no case of fever of any kind reported among the 400 men in the "Bristol" who had not boarded the "Isis." Surgeon Ayre of the "Bristol," after expressing his astonishment at this escape further goes on to say-" The men employed as nurses, numbering twenty-four, who were hanging for hours over, and supporting in their arms, their dying shipmates, their frocks in many cases accidently covered with black vomit and treading with their naked feet the black vomit about the deck, none of these men suffered from fever nor did any of the five medical officers who were in constant attendance on the sick. Also on removal of the sick to hospital at Ascension not a single case occurred among either the nurses or the medical officers of that establishment." Ayre could suggest no source of infection of the "Bristol's" victims, except possibly the rain water tanks of the "Isis," from which some of the "Bristol's" working party had drunk. He little realized that these tanks did contain the solution of his problem. These old dep6t hulks used to be roofed in and the water from the roofs was collected in tanks for washing purposes. The tanks formed ideal aquaria in which a home-grown stock of the Aedes could be maintained, however far the ship was moored off the beach.
See how simple the explanation of this mysterious sequence of events is to-day: The " Isis " mosquitoes were easily infected by any sailor who caught yellow fever in the epidemic raging ashore. The Surgeon of the "Rattlesnake" became infected in the "Isis." He "went sick" in his own vessel, which must have been " infectable," i.e., had Aedes on board at the time of his illness. He infected these insects and a ship epidemic followed. The party from the "Bristol" were for two days working among the infected AMdes in the " Isis," and 35% of them subsequently developed the disease on returning to their own ship, but they did not pass it on to their shipmates because the "Bristol" was uninfectable, i.e., there could have been no vectors on board. Aedes egypti are plentiful in Ascension, but, by the time the " Bristol's " sick were landed, all had passed the stage where they were capable of infecting the insect vector-Ascension this time was saved. But, on other occasions, she was not so lucky. Yellow fever was conveyed to Ascension by the " Bann " in 1823, and the " Bonetta " in 1838. In both these ships yellow fever was epidemic and in spite of careful quarantine infected mosquitoes could easily have got ashore.
(4) The incubation period.-The nature of ships enables one to make exact and reliable estimates of the incubation period of a disease. Many naval records show that the incubation period of yellow fever is not infrequently over a week. For example, the " Bristol's " victims were on board the "Isis " on December 27 and 28, the first cases went sick on December 31, the last on January 12, a range of incubation of from three to fifteen days. In seven instances, according to the dates in the naval record, the incubation period must have been over seven days. In another instance two sailors from a ship slept ashore in the same house. The one developed a " mild tertian intermittent " ten days later, the other, after fifteen days, developed a fever which " ran its course with all the violence of the yellow remittent of hot countries." Incidentally the surgeon remarks on the peculiar circumstance that two patients, under identical conditions of exposure, should have exhibited such dissimilar clinical pictures. Obviously each of these men had fed a different species of mosquito. Such events, combined with some recent observation in the field and laboratory, and the incubation period in Low and Fairley's [31 patients which was most probably ten days, demonstrate that the incubation period of yellow fever does sometimes exceed a week. I have stressed this point because nearly every textbook insists that the incubation period is always less than six days. Moreover, the regulations for maritime quarantine, laid down by the International Sanitary Convention of 1926, are framed on the hypothesis that the incubation period of yellow fever never exceeds six days. If this hypothesis is false there is still a real danger of ships conveying yellow fever to infectable seaports.
(5) Diagnosis and symptomatology.-Before the " seventies" the diagnosis of yellow fever was rarely made in the Navy, except during epidemics, unless the patient had black vomit and jaundice. In the later " sixties " the clinical thermometer came into general use, and even if the diagnosis did not improve much, the cases of fever were much better described, chiefly I believe as the result of a masterly paper on yellow fever by Deputy Inspector-General J. J. L. Donnet of the R.N. Hospital in Jamaica in 1866 and 1867. He carefully analysed the clinical details, including temperature charts, quantitative albumin records, and post-mortem findings of all the fever patients under his medical charge, including four of his seven medical colleagues who died. As a result of this careful investigation he insisted that yellow fever was always a distinct clinical entity and never a variety of common remittent fever, i.e., subtertian malaria. He clearly demonstrated how yellow fever differed from malaria, in that it was not a remittent fever, one attack caused immunity, relapse never occurred, and quinine was useless. He further maintained that black vomit, or even jaundice, was not necessarily present, and finally to quote his own words-" the characteristic and essentially pathognomonic symptom of this disease is the presence of albuminuria." He presents sound reasons why the causes as well as the clinical picture of yellow fever and malaria must also be different and concludes with--" the noxious principle of yellow fever differs in toto from that which produces simple continued and remittent fever." But Donnet was before his time, because the orthodox editor of his paper adds a footnote to explain that his views were contrary to those held by all the best authorities. But Donnet's work must have been well known to all naval surgeons who were serving at the time in the West Indies, and consequently, we now begin to find a few surgeons who boldly diagnose yellow fever in cases that neither die, nor vomit blood and who lay stress on albuminuria, and the absence of response to quinine, as factors in the recognition of the disease. Occasionally cases which were probably not yellow fever were recorded as such. A very interesting example of such an error is the outbreak in H.M.S. " Scout " in 1866. This ship was infected with typical yellow fever at the island of Tobago just south of Panama, there being no doubt of the diagnosis, the " Scout" fled north. The ship's surgeon was one of the first fatal cases, so the Assistant-Surgeon, Carmichael, took medical charge. This officer relates how, after the ship had put to sea, the character of some of the cases underwent a peculiar change. Dragging pains in the loins and general muscular pains were the most prominent symptoms, yet, strange to relate, these cases were in other respects, the mildest, and the patients had least signs of kidney trouble. They were, however, subject to irregular raised scarlatiniform eruptions, followed by desquamation of the palms of the hands and soles of the feet. All this time malignant and fatal cases of yellow fever with black vomit and albuminuria continued to crop up. Carmichael says that the symptoms of these milder cases bore " such a close resemblance to those of broken-back fever-the dengue of American authors-as to suggest the idea of their identity." He, however, decided that the existence of the two diseases at the same time was so improbable that all his thirty-six cases of fever must have been yellow. The orthodox Admiralty commentator also adds a note saying: " It has been shown long ago that there is no connection whatever between dengue and yellow fever." But I think Carmichael's account is so lucid and circumstantial that there can be no reasonable doubt that the mosquitoes on board the " Scout " were infested with the viruses of both diseases. This episode is of interest to-day in regard to the question of cross-immunity between dengue and yellow fever and a suggestion that these two diseases are not often endemic in the same areas. The latter suggestion has little foundation in fact; for example, Bermuda has suffered from severe epidemics of both dengue and yellow fever; so has Senegal, where, it is said, a dengue epidemic so often precedes yellow fever outbreaks as to be a valuable warning of the imminent appearance of the more serious disease. Moreover, Carter [4] , was of the opinion that there is a considerable error in some of the returns of yellow fever from South America, an error which is caused by a coincident prevalence of dengue and yellow fever, which reverses the usual position of affairs by tending to cause an underinstead of an over-statement of the case fatality of yellow fever.
(6) The morbidity and fatality.-The British Naval Squadron which suffered most from yellow fever was that employed on the West Coast of Africa in suppressing the slave trade. Prior to 1856 there is no exact record of the incidence and mortality from yellow fever, but between 1825 and 1845 there are reliable ones of the total mortality from disease (excluding injuries and wounds in war). gives the mean annual disease mortalities for the 20 years 1825-45 on the different Naval Stations. The mortality was six times as great in the West African Squadron as at home, and three times greater than on the other yellow fever station, the West Indies. The excess of deaths in the West African Squadron was almost entirely caused by yellow fever. The mortality was, however, very unevenly distributed. In 1829, the worst year in the record, more than a quarter of the total Naval force employed in West Africa died from disease. Besides being distributed irregularly in time, the deaths were most irregularly divided among the different vessels composing the Squadron and tended to be concentrated in only one or two ships. Table II gives the number of deaths in each ship during 
121
"All or nothing " effect. three yellow fever years. This table shows a kind of " all or nothing " effect-a ship either had a colossal death-rate or escaped lightly. Intermediate rates were absent. In 1829 the " Eden " was responsible for half the total mortality, the " Sybille " and " Hecla "supplied the other half, while in the remaining four ships the death-rate was relatively negligible. The epidemic in the "Sybille" continued into the following year. when she and the "Plumper " produced six-sevenths of the deaths in the Squadron. In 1845 the Fleet had increased to 28 ships and one of them, the "Eclair," was responsible for 60% of all the deaths from disease.
The " Eclair" became notorious and received much attention from the lay and medical press of the time. There is no doubt that she conveyed yellow fever to the island of Bona Vista in the Cape Verde group. At this time the Admiralty seemed to be trying to keep quiet the existence of yellow fever in the West African Squadron.
We are first told that, while at Sierra Leone, on 23rd July, 1845, thle "Eclair" contracted a severe form of "distinctly remittent fever." No very clear account of these early cases is given; perhaps owing to the subsequent death of the surgeons. However, some patients vomited "brownish flocculi" and most died on the fourth day of illness. Moreover the sailmaker, who sewed the victims into their hammocks prior to burial, reported that the bodies were yellow." The" Eclair" arrived at Bona Vista on the 21st August. The port medical authority suspected that there was yellow fever on board, bhut since the ship's surgeon declared he had only cases of " common African fever," the "Eclair's " crew and patients were allowed to land.
During the next 12 days 37 men contracted a fever, of which 25 died, and the disease began to ravage the island of Bona Vista. The fever is now frankly admitted to be yellow, but the Admiralty commentator makes the significant remark:-" This is not the place, however, to trace the progress of the fever on the island of Bona V7ista, nor is it perhaps the timiie considering that the subject is still under investigation."
It is now evident why the first cases on board the "Eclair " were not called yellow fever. The British Government were probably having an embarrassing time trying to explain to the Portuguese authorities why the "Eclair" had been allowed to infect Bona Vista. Their only possible defence was to deny the existence of yellow fever in the "Eclair" prior to her arrival at the island, and maintain that she contracted the disease at Bona Vista, or to deny in toto the contagiousness of yellow fever. In fact it was not unlikely that the "Eclair" inquiry had a share in the production of the regrettable quarantine report of 1852, which pronounced that yellow fever could not be conveyed by ships from place to place.
By the time the "Eclair" left the Cape Verde Islands, her own doctors were dead, so she borrowed one from Bona Vista. He and the captain of the ship having died en route to Madeira, a fourth surgeon joined and managed to record five more cases before being fatally infected himself. The "Eclair" arrived in England on September 28, and Dr. ('offey took over medical charge and at once took the fever. Two more surgeons joined before the end of the epidemic. The last case, which developed on October 11, was that of Dr. Rogers, the seventh medical officer to join the "Eclair" within three months. I am glad to say that he recovered.
The " Eclair's " history illustrates three points of great interest. First, the epidemic explains the excessive mortality of medical men. It is obvious that anyone who visited a ship in the "Eclair's " condition ran a great risk of contracting fatal yellow fever, and doctors in the vicinity of any infected ship must naturally have helped their living colleagues on board, even when they did not officially replace the sick or dead medical officer of the ship. Second, eleven fresh cases and four deaths occurred after the "Eclair " had arrived in Portsmouth; of these, four were men who joined her while in England. The continuance of the epidemic after arrival home shows that the insect vectors could remain active in the warmth between decks, since it is scarcely possible that any English October could be warm enough for Aedes agypti to be active in the open. Third, these ship epidemics prove definitely the high virulence of certain strains of yellow fever; the " Eclair " had a crew of 120 men, 74 died. The case fatality could not therefore have been less than 61 % even if no man had escaped attack. The " Eclair's " was not an exceptional case; in different years the " Eden," " BaDn," " Sybille," " Trident," and other ships lost more than half their ship's companies from yellow fever. But generally, especially in the later years, such holocausts were limited by the ship, once it was realized yellow fever was epidemic, flying due north or south till the thermometer dropped to 600 F. On the other hand, it must not be thought that such death-rates were inevitable in ship epidemics of yellow fever. In later years when cases are better described, we find many instances of ship epidemics, which were most likely to have been yellow fever, accompanied by little or no fatality. In most of them however, the absence of mortality makes the medical officer refuse to diagnose yellow fever. Not always, however, because we read that as early as 1834 the " Tweed," a corvette serving in the West Indies, recorded 159 cases of yellow fever with thirteen deaths, only an 8 2% fatality. And in 1871 the " Racoon," while in the West Indies, returned eighteen cases of yellow fever with no deaths; at the same time that there were twenty-six cases called " remittent fever." The surgeon describes his cases well, and in those which he returned as yellow fever there were bleeding gums, epigastric pain, jaundice, and marked albuminuria. All the patients were very ill for about a week, but made a rapid recovery. The Admiralty commentator actually suggests that these eighteen cases could not have been yellow fever because none died, whereas it is more than probable that the whole forty-six cases of " fever " were due to a yellow fever virus of far lower virulence than that responsible for such outbreaks as the one in the " Eclair." A study of these fevers in ships proves that the virus of yellow fever varies greatly in virulence. Ships, containing men of the same nationality and age, with equal experience of the tropics, and living under identical conditions, produced groups of yellow fever cases in which the mortality varied from nothing to over 60%. Moreover the average case fatality of " recorded " yellow fever varied with the locality. Table III shows that between 1856 and 1871 the recorded fatality was significantly higher on the African than on the West Indian station. It also shows that the fatality as recorded in the West Indies was the same after as before 1870. There were never more than one or two small ships cruising in South American waters, so the number of cases reported from this station was small, but the fatality as recorded is lower than in the West Indies. The greater malignancy of the African virus is further proved by the total mortality (as distinct from case fatality) in single ships serving in the West Indies never being equal to the highest mortalities reported from the African Squadron . Table III also compares the fatality from "remittent and continued fever," as entered in the returns of the West African and West Indian squadrons during the same period. This heading chiefly represents malaria, but must include an unknown number of enteric fever and missed yellow fever cases. Enteric fever caused little trouble on either station during these years, and malarih has always been much more malignant in type in West Africa than in the West Indies, and more than double as prevalent after, as well as before, the disappearance of yellow fever from the Navy. We must however, allow some mortality to enteric fever and malignant malaria. and because Table III shows that the recorded fatality of remittent fever was hardly more than one would expect from subtertian malaria, it is not justifiable to borrow any of these deaths to add to those of yellow fever. It appears, therefore, that fatal yellow fever was nearly always correctly diagnosed. On the other band this does not mean that many of the non-fatal cases recorded under the heading of remittent fever may not have been missed cases of yellow fever. There was evidence throughout the whole Naval record of a marked reluctance to call any case yellow fever which did not exhibit the two cardinal signs-black vomit and jaundice. And, in the absence of an epidemic, one might almost add, the death of the patient within a week was necessary, in order to identify a sporadic case of yellow fever. Many Naval surgeons were sure that yellow fever was non-infectious, while they knew that the seamen were equally convinced that it was highly contagious. Therefore unless the patient died, or an epidemic was in progress, it is probable that many surgeons thought it wise to use " remittent " as a euphemism for " yellow." Indeed one medical "Jesuit " candidly confessed that he never called a case yellow fever because of the panic it caused in the ship, and the trouble it made with Port Health Authorities! If such an attitude of mind was common, there is no wonder that the disease was conveyed by ships to any seaport inhabited by the insect vector. Table IV gives an analysis of the tropical fever statistics of the West Indian Squadron in 1861--one of the worst yellow fever years in the Naval record of this station. The table was designed to give some idea of the magnitude of the error of diagnosis of yellow fever. The twenty-five ships in the squadron were divided into three groups. The first consisted of four vessels in which fever spread as a definite ship epidemic-these ships must have been infected with Aedes. The second group comprised four ships, which averaged six cases of yellow fever apiece. These cases were " sporadic." The infection was probably contracted ashore and the disease showed no tendency to spread in the ships which were probably free from mosquitoes. The remaining vessels returned no cases of yellow fever, though it is more than likely that they did have a few "sporadic" cases which were entered under the heading, "remittent fever." 
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There were 144 deaths; all were attributed to yellow fever except three. Table IV shows that: (a) There was a total of 144 deaths. All except three of these were attributed to yellow fever. The absence of mortality due to fever, other than yellow, combined with the evidence in the body of the report for 1861, makes it fair to assume that enteric morbidity was negligible this year; hence remittent fever was either malaria or "missed" yellow fever. (b) The " all or nothing" phenomenon in mortality, previously noted in West Africa, is well brought out in the West Indian statistics; four sbips out of twenty-five accounted for 129 out of the 144 deaths reported. (c) The "recorded" fatality for yellow fever in the four " epidemic " ships varied from 24 to 80%. When however the fatality is calculated on all tropical fevers, the variability practically disappears, and the total fever case mortalities lie between 21 and 29%. The four ships in this group contracted yellow fever in the summer of 1861 at approximately the same place-the " Firebrand" at Cartagena, the others at Havana. Although the virulence of yellow fever varies widely at different times and places, yet when ships are infected with the same specific disease at the same time and place, they usually show similar case fatalities. Therefore the divergencies in the recorded case fatality from yellow fever are more likely to have been caused by the variable psychology of the diagnosticians than by differencies in the virulence of the virus. For instance, the medical officer of the " Jason " was not scared of diagnosing yellow fever; hence only one out of five of his " recorded " yellow fever patients died. In contrast the doctor of the " Firebrand" would not call a case one of yellow fever unless he could help it, consequently four out of five of his " official" yellow fever patients died. Here is a summary of the fever cases entered in the "Firebrand's" sick list for the week ending June 29, 1861, while she was in mid-ocean flying north to Halifax: four ephemeral, twenty-four remittent, and twenty-six yellow. There can be little doubt that all these cases, occurring at sea in the same week, were caused by the same virus, though only half are recorded as cases of yellow fever. (d) The second group of ships returned a few sporadic cases of yellow fever which were probably all contracted ashore. Now, if remittent fever (as officially recorded) was always caused by an agent which was specifically distinct from that causing yellow fever, there is no reason why this and the last group of ships, employed doing the same duties in the same places as the first group, should show an attack rate for remittent fever which was only a seventh of that produced by the first group of ships in which yellow fever was definitely epidemic. (e) In the group of ships, which were " officially" free from yellow fever, the remittent fever morbidity was approximately the same as in the " sporadic" group. Therefore, in both groups, most of the remittent fever cases were probably malaria infections, but may have included one or two missed cases of " sporadic " yellow fever.
The inference which follows from this data is, that about five-sixths of the remittent fever recorded in the first group of ships was yellow fever, and that therefore the real morbidity of yellow fever in the West Indian squadron of 1861 was about double that recorded in the official report, and the real case fatality approximated 20% instead of the official figure of 45%.
It is of course general knowledge that the case fatality in the historical records of yellow fever must have been often exaggerated by the failure to recognize mild cases. According to Carter [.5 ], in the present century, when the diagnosis has been reliable, the fatality among Europeans in North and Central America has rarely exceeded 10%. And in Panama, in the worst epidemic of which Carter had personal experience, the fatality was only 16 6%. Carter also says that in this century yellow fever has been a less fatal disease in South America than in Central America or the West Indies. The estimated fatality among adult sailors in the West Indian Squadron in 1861 is consistent with the modern figures ashore, when we remember that the latter include children who suffer less severely from yellow fever than do adults.
Further, recent experience has shown how deadly yellow fever is to Europeans in West Africa. The Naval statistics show that in the last century the disease was more malignant in Africa than in America, and therefore it is probable that yellow fever has always been a more lethal disease to Europeans in the old world than in the new. (7) Racial immunity.-In the Naval records from West Africa we find many references to the immunity of the native to yellow fever. These observations are especially significant, because the Kromen, who signed on to supplement the white crews, lived under the same conditions as the latter. Most references note the complete escape of the coloured members of the ship's company. Their immunity to yellow fever was so well recognized that often they were purposely used to attend the sick, as in the "Eclair "epidemic in which, it is stated, no Kroman on board got the fever. Again, in the "Trident," which lost 55% of the 195 whites on board, none of the 33 blacks were attacked. However, the negroes were not always completely immune to attack, for it is stated in the account of the yellow fever outbreak in the " Isis " that " some of the Kromen were affected, but in them the disease seldom assumed a malignant character." In another instance ten whites and one Canadian-born negro, who were the prize crew of a captured slaver, were attacked by yellow fever, while none of the slaves fell sick. The illness of the Canadian negro is noteworthy as a hint that the frequent immunity of native born Africans to attack may not be an entirely hereditary character. In the report for 1862 there is an interesting account of an epidemic in the Niger Delta. This outbreak started among the natives at Bonney and spread through the Niger Delta to New and Old Calabar. The disease then spread to the white settlers and to the crews of the merchant ships in the river. Two-thirds of the Europeans in this locality are said to have perished. A few sporadic cases of typical yellow fever also occurred in H.M.S. " Bloodhound," which was cruising in the neighbourhood. The mail boat, " Retriever," then carried the epidemic to Fernando Po, where it decimated the Spaniards of unmixed blood, though not one of the coloured settlers in the island, i.e., liberated slaves from the West Indies, were attacked. The differences in racial immunity in this epidemic are remarkable. The Europeans and native Africans in the Niger Delta were susceptible, while the West Indian " Africans" were immune.
This observation indicates that the latter who were freed slaves from Cuba had acquired immunity in the West Indies before settling in Fernando Po, while for some reason the herd-immunity of their blood relations in this region of Africa had lapsed. The Naval record (whether it is right I do not know) states that this was the first time that yellow fever had been reported from this part of the coast; the writer of the record was convinced that the disease must have been introduced by vessels which were engaged in the slave trade with the West Indies. On the other hand, this district is connected by the Niger or its tributaries with Ibadan and Illorin, large native towns which Beeuwkes, Bauer and Mahaffy [61 have shown, are, at the present day, an endemic focus of yellow fever. In 1929 these investigators found that the blood-sera of about 40% of the natives in Ibadan had the power of neutralizing the virus of yellow fever, while on the coast at Freetown, where no yellow fever has been reported for over twenty years, they only discovered one native whose blood had this property. It is possible, therefore, that this focus was present in 1862; and, as in recent times, under unknown conditions, which might be a good mosquito season, or a decaying herd-immunity at the periphery of the endemic area, yellow fever spread down the water-ways and trade routes to the coast. This region, the most densely populated in tropical Africa, may be the one place in the world where yellow fever can now maintain a permanent endemicitywhere the domesticated species of the Aedes genus was evolved, and where the very specialized virus of yellow fever became closely adapted to a very specialized environment.
Donnet, in the paper already referred to, makes some pertinent remarks on immunity to yellow fever. He notes that not only the coloured inhabitants of the Jamaican lowlands were immune, but also the Europeans who had been any length of time on the Island. That visitors to Jamaica, provided they had come from a non-endemic area, were susceptible, even if they were negroes; so also were many of the coloured inhabitants of the highlands of Jamaica who contracted yellow fever if they came into Kingston in epidemic years. Donnet believed that the germ of yellow fever (he supported the microbic theory of disease, though writing in 1866) always lay latent in the soil of Jamaica and could only cause typical yellow fever when circumstances were propitious. He supported his theory by asserting, that if looked for, sporadic cases of yellow fever could always be found in Jamaica in inter-epidemic years. He said this germ might be taken into the body and pass out again without causing disease. Donnet clearly was of opinion that the immunity of the coloured races was as much an acquired as a racial character, and that this immunity was acquired by mild attacks of illness, not recognizable as yellow fever. A similar immunity phenomenon was also seen in Vera Cruz, one of the few places in the New World where the old conditions were suitable for the establishment of a permanent endemic focus of yellow fever. The Mexican residents of Vera Cruz were relatively immune, but when Mexicans from up country visited the town they frequently developed yellow fever. There was also a popular belief that anyone born in Vera Cruz could never get yellow fever. Therefore Mexican ladies when pregnant often journeyed to Vera Cruz in order that their offspring might acquire this valuable character.
It appears to me that many points in the epidemiology of yellow fever require the hypothesis of latent immunization by. unrecognized infection for their complete description. It is a well established fact that African adults, like the children of other races, as the result of their racial genetic characters, react less severely and fatally when attacked by the virus of yellow fever. But the susceptibility of unseasoned Africans to mild attacks is not definitely less than that of Europeans to severe attacks. The immunity to attack so often exhibited by native Africans is hence, an acquired character which has been stimulated in infancy, or later in life, by mild unrecognized, or even subClinical, infections with the virus of yellow fever.
(8) The West African origin of yellow fever.-For practical purposes the coast of West Africa and America may be said to have been discovered by Europe at about the same time. Thus we cannot hope to find any evidence of yellow fever in ships before the sixteenth century. I think, however, that a knowledge of the behaviour in ships of all epidemic diseases, in addition to yellow fever, strengthens the evidence which Carter [4] has collected, and from which he deduces the West African origin of the disease. Carter, though he refuses to stress the fact, could find no record from the New World of any ship epidemic that could have been yellow fever prior to 1648, when the first epidemic of yellow fever was reported from Yucatan. On the other hand there are several accounts of ship epidemics in West African waters in the sixteenth century which Carter thinks might have been yellow fever. In regard to two of these outbreaks (if the quoted data is correct) I would venture to be much more dogmatic than Carter. Sir Francis Drake's expedition in 1585, almost without doubt, contracted yellow fever at the Cape Verde Islands, while it is almost certain that in 1553 Widam and Pintiado's men got yellow fever. About 100 of the 140 sailors in this venture died from disease while on board their ship. The epidemic occurred off the mouth of the Benin river, ran its course " in little over a month," and from three to five men died daily. As long as seamen are not landed, cholera, dysentery, plague, and enteric fever rarely spread in ships. Since reliable records have been kept, malignant malaria has never killed 5% of a Naval ship's company in a year as long as they were afloat much less 70% in a month. Scurvy could not cause such a mortality so quickly. Smallpox is hardly conceivable, but it is perhaps the only other disease, besides yellow fever that could have killed in a month 100 out of 140 sixteenth century seamen afloat on West African waters. It is also noteworthy that the mouth of the Benin river is situated on the part of the coast nearest to the recently discovered focus of yellow fever in Ibadan. Now devastating ship epidemics of yellow fever have attracted so much attention that their relative 19 United Services Section 455 rarity is not realized. Between 1825 and 1845 Naval ships on the West African Station were in more danger of infection by yellow fever than any ships engaged in trade, because the Naval vessels were on the coast for the whole year. They visited many rivers, creelis, harbours, and native villages, and boarded all suspicious ships looking for evidence of slave dealing; whereas merchantmen generally touched at one or two places for a few weeks at most, then loaded up and were off again. Yet what do we find? Only ten of H.M. ships had more than twenty men die in a year out of 291 " ship years." (The average complement per ship was 71). Moreover in the ten ships with the highest mortality the excess was always due to yellow fever, never to any other complaint. (The prevention of scurvy was understood in this period but not the prevention of anything else.) Yet, in spite of their relative rarity, several explosive and fatal ship epidemics are reported from West Africa in the sixteenth century at a time when the fuller historical record of the much greater shipping activity in the New World is silent as regards such events. Moreover, Carter [4] wrote his book before the discovery of the Ibadan focus.
He believed that the whole West coast, from Senegal to Angola, was a permanent regional endemic area, that is yellow fever was always present on some part of it. To-day the evidence is all in favour of a permanent endemic centre in the interior, from which yellow fever, when conditions are suitable, makes occasional sorties on the inhabitants of more or less isolated sections of the coast. The epidemic described above among the natives of Bonney in 1862 may illustrate one of these sorties. Besides the modern evidence that yellow fever is not permanently endemic on the West African coast, there is the fact that in the early nineteenth century many settlements, such as Sierra Leone, might be some years without having a case. Again, in the Navy between the years 1856 and 1871, no case of yellow fever was reported from West Africa in eight out of the fifteen years. While during the same period, when yellow fever was permanently endemic in such seaports as Havana and Vera Cruz, the West Indian squadron returned some cases every year. Therefore, if yellow fever was not always present on the coast of West Africa, we have yet another reason for the scarcity of early historical evidence of the disease in this area.
An epidemic in a ship about which nothing is known but that there was high mortality in a short time among the seamen living on board, becomes therefore of much greater significance than similar vague descriptions of disease in landed expeditions and early colonial settlements. Because, for reasons given elsewhere, [7] although, under ideal conditions of transmission and continual reinfection, fatal fulminating epidemics can be caused ashore, by malaria, intestinal, or other infections. yet the necessary conditions for such an event are rarely if ever present in a ship afloat. Therefore, when all the data in Carter's book are correlated with what the Naval record tells us about yellow fever, and the behaviour of other epidemic diseases in ships, the fact that, during the 150 years after the discovery of America, several devastating ship epidemics were reported from West Africa, but none from the New World, assumes a greater significance, than Carter himself allows, in the hypothesis that yellow fever, and perhaps also its insect vector, was introduced into the New World from West Africa some time after the voyages of Columbus.
(9) Conclusion.
This research of the old Naval reports on yellow fever produces some evidence in favour of certain propositions which even to-day are by no means proved. These are that: (1) The incubation period of yellow fever may sometimes exceed a week.
(2) The case fatality in groups, similarly in herd-immunity and every other respect, may vary from nothing to 60%. (3) West African strains of the virus are as a rule more fatal than American strains to Europeans. (4) Transmission of the virus by other means than its specific vector is too rare to have any practical bearing on the epidemiology of yellow fever. (5) The Naval record is consistent with the hypothesis that yellow fever originated in the interior of Africa.
